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The major function of this study was to assess differences in interpersonal 
cognitive complexity among the four belief systems specified by Harvey’s 
Conceptual Systems Theory. In addition, criticism is offered of many 
of the more commonly used indicators of cognitive complexity (e.g. Bieri,
1955) since they tend to identify cognitive complexity with cognitive 
differentiation. Herein is offered an alternative method of measuring 
cognitive complexity which is seen as indicating both differentiation and
integration. The study used 54 graduate and undergraduate students, of
7* ••
which 35 were females and 19 were males. The alternative method of 
calculating cognitive complexity relies upon Hinkle’sy (1965) "laddering" 
technique. A set of constructs was initially elicited from each subject 
using Kelly’s standard Rep grid. Out of these constructs one of the subordinate 
constructs, as estimated by means of Hinkle’s "implication grid," was used 
as the base from which a series of*other constructs were sequentially elicited, 
with each successive construct being superordinate to that which proceded it.
In the context of the pyramidally-shaped theoretical model of cognitive 
structure herein presented, it is proposed that the number of constructs which 
can be strung together in such a subordinate-superordinate chain represents 
the number of hierarchical levels within.: the cognitive structure and it is 
this number of hierarchical levels which is proposed as a more accurate 
approximator of cognitive complexity. Findings revealed, in fact, that there was 
a negative correlation between a differentiation analysis of complexity and the 
laddering analysis, suggesting that traditional differentiation scores not 
only fail to take integration into account, but, in fact* misrepresent 
integration as a lack of cogntivie differentiation. With regard to the
major hypothesis, neither differentiation scores nor laddering scores 
discriminated among any of Harvey’s four conceptual systems, indicating that 
Conceptual Systems Theory draws primarily qualitative, rather than quanti­
tative, distinctions among construct dimensions used By the four system 
types.
CONCEPTUAL SYSTEMS THEORY AND COGNITIVE COMPLEXITY 
Thomas T. CoIyer 
Univeristy of Nebraska at Omaha 
Conceptual Systems Theory (CST) was posited by Harvey, Hunt, and 
Schroder (1961) as a theoretical proposition identifying four relatively 
independent belief systems into which individuals could be classified.
As originally set forth, CST proposed that the four belief systems be 
viewed in developmental terms, thereby implying sequential invariance. 
Identified as Systems 1, 2, 3, and 4, the first three systems were 
considered to be "arrested stages" composed of individuals who fail to
t *'r''
develop optimally due to inadequate developmental conditions. Harvey 
characterizes a "belief system" in the following manner: .
A "belief system" represents a broad constellation of pre- ; 
dispositions to perceive, feel affectively and respond toward 
ego-involving stimuli, persons and situations. Each system 
thus should be viewed as being multi-dimensional, possessing 
in some cases certain attributes shared by other systems.
However, the constellation or configuration or gestalt different 
for each system renders psychologically different what, out of 
such context, would otherwise appear to be similar attributes 
in some cases. Thinking in terms of a factor analytic model*or 
some superordinate construct, a system should be viewed as a high- 
order factor or construct. (Harvey, note 1, p. 10)
The cognitive dimension conceived to be primary in distinguishing 
between these four belief systems was that of "concreteness— abstractness," 
referring to the manner in which the subject differentiated and integrated 
his environment. Concreteness was identified with less differentiation and
2integration, greater reliance upon conventional attitudes, traditions 
and authority, greater rigidity, greater intolerance of ambiguity, greater 
need for cognitive consistency, and greater tendencies toward absolute 
(good— bad) evaluations. Greater abstractness, on the other hand, was 
seen to correspond with a greater ability to generate multiple interpre­
tations and a lesser propensity toward rigid stimulus-response connected­
ness. In addition, cognitive abstractness was seen as highly related to 
a tendency toward greater relativism with respect to both an individual's 
thoughts and behaviors.
The four primary belief systems are clearly distinguishable in a 
number of ways, among which is the fact that System 1 individuals are 
characterized by both the "a priority assumption” •—  that all objects 
and events are controlled by some omnipotent authority —  and the 
assumption that "truth1' and "reality" exist externally and independently 
of the perceiver. As a result, such individuals rely heavily upon 
traditions, normative standards, authority figures,. and societal laws• 
as their guidelines for action. Among such persons one finds a high 
degree of religious fundamentalism, relatively high ethnocentrism, and 
an overall high need for structure. They have very strong tendencies 
to make absolute evaluations into such dichotomous categories as "good 
or bad," with very little tendency to recognize any gradations between 
the poles.
The System 2^ individual is best characterized as a "rebel" who 
steadfastly rejects ,the external referents of System 1 persons but who 
does not have any stable, clearly defined referents of his own on which 
to rely. While generally accepting the idea of absolute truth, he rejects
3those institutional embodiments of such a truth upon which System 1 
persons rely so heavily. System 2 persons seem to exist in a psychological 
void, and are best characterized by a high sense of anomie, considerable 
cynicism, and very low self-esteem (Harvey, 1967).
System 3 individuals represent increased abstractness due to their 
ability to comprehend various- points of view, although their understanding 
tends to be characterized by a certain air of superficiality or shallow­
ness in that such persons rarely express strong commitment along any 
particular line of belief. Their central concern is for personal 
acceptance and approval by others, but at the same time they tend to 
foster dependencies in others upon themselves.
Their need to have others dependent upon them and .-to administer 
nurturance to others seems to be directed most toward individuals 
of low status and low power, possibly because such individuals 
are perceived by System 3 persons as being more helpless and 
consequently more receptive to their overtures toward helping.
The manifest and latent distinction often made in personality 
theory is also appropriate to System 3 functioning. At the 
manifest level, System 3 persons espouse the cause of the more 
helpless, proclaim the importance of love and universal human 
concern, and express a high desire to help mankind in general.
At the more latent level, System 3 individuals at the same time 
are asking that they be the focus of potential help. (Harvey, 
note 1, p. 14)
j
System 4 persons are viewed as the most differentiated and the most 
integrated of the four systems, and they are best characterized by a balanced 
need for both mutuality and autonomy. They tend to rank high in terms 
of both creativity and tolerance of stress. Whereas Systems 1 and 2 persons
4tend to validate their conceptions in terms of a priority and System 3 
individuals rely upon concensus, System 4 persons tend to be pluralistic 
in their search for explanatory principles, recognizing the contributions 
of both situational and personality factors in their assessments of events.
The instrument used by Harvey to classify individuals into conceptual 
systems is the "This I Believe" (TIB) test. Of several thousand college 
students to whom he administered this test, Harvey (note 1) has reported 
that approximately 35% were classified as System 1, 15% as System 2,
20% as System 3, and 7% as System 4. In addition to the four primary 
systems, the original theory also recognized certain admixtures of systems, 
and the remaining 23% of students were found to be such combinations of 
two or more systems. However, both Harvey’s own research .and that of
" v r%'.
his colleagues indicate considerable changes in these percentages have 
occurred over the past decade, with the major changes being a decrease 
in System 2 individuals and an increase in admixtures (Harvey, note 2).
In addition, although as yet unpublished, Harvey has altered his beliefs 
with respect to the sequentiality of the four belief systems. Harvey 
now believes that these systems represent four prominent and "relatively" 
permanent coping strategies for dealing with one’s environment. Harvey 
presently speculates that it is likely that one passes through sequential 
stages somewhat analogous to the four belief systems (increasing differ- 
tiation and integration, increasing evaluative relativism, etc.) within 
"each" of the belief systems (Harvey, note 2).
In addition to CST, another means of investigating the manner in 
which one deals with his/her environment is with reference to the 
individual’s interpersonal cognitive complexity, a field of exploration
5.
launched by Jones (1954) and followed up by Bieri (1955) and others 
(e.g., Tripodi & Bieri, 1963; Jaspars, 1963; Bieri, Atkins, Briar, Leamon,
& Tripodi, 1966), [Leitner, Landfield, & Barr, note 3}. This field 
derives from Kelly1s (1955) theory of personal constructs, wherein a manTs 
central characteristics are identified as his propensity for increased 
accuracy of prediction in the area of interpersonal relationships.
According to Bieri, the accuracy of one’s predictions is largely determined 
by the degree of differentiation associated with one’s construct system. 
Inasmuch as constructs represent differential perceptions or 
discriminations of the environment, it would be Jexpec ted that 
the greater the degree of differentiation among the constructs, 
the greater will be the predictive power of tbe individual.
In other words, there should be a positive relationship between 
how well an individual’s system of constructs differentiates , 
people in the environment and how well the individual can predict 
the behavior of these people... A system of constructs which 
differentiates highly among persons is considered to be cogni­
tively complex. A construct system which provides poor differ­
entiation among persons is considered to be cognitively simple in 
structure. (Bieri, 1955, p. 263)
The area of cognitive complexity has been explored primarily through the 
use of Kelly’s (1955) Role Construct Repertory (Rep) technique. An in 
depth review of the use of the Rep technique can be found in Bannister 
and Mair (1968), and a review of the use of this technique in the 
investigation of cognitive complexity can be found in Leitner, Landfield, 
and Barr (note 3). Briefly, the Rep technique has subjects consider
6various triads of persons with whom they are familiar, and for each 
triad the subject is asked to generate what Kelly refers to as a 
bipolar "construct'1 stating the way in which two of the individuals are
alike and different from the third person. For example, in viewing a
i '
particular triad the subject may generate the construct dimension
"loving-cruel", indicating that the subj ect perceives two of the persons
as similar, in that they are "loving," and the third person as dissimilar,
in that he/she is perceived as being "cruel." In the assessment of
cognitive complexity subjects are usually requested to generate 10 to
15 personal constructs, each of which is seen as a cfimension used by
that subject in the interpretation of his/her interpersonal environment.
Kelly (1955) found that when subjects were asked to generate as many
bipolar dimensions as they could, forty constructs was found to be
about the maximum number produced. When the constructs have been
generated, subjects are asked to rate "all" of the persons used in the
various triads on each of the construct dimensions which were generated,
and although various techniques have been used to arrive at an estimate
of cognitive complexity (Leitner, Landfield, & Barr, note 3), each
estimate considers the differences with respect to the ratings of the 
••
various constructs across the set of persons. Results of such techniques 
have produced a variety of indicators of cognitive complexity, all of 
which purport to represent the number of separate construct dimensions 
used by a subject in the interpretation of his/her environment.
A major criticism of Bieri (1955) and other investigators (Tripodi 
& Bieri, 1963; Jaspars, note 7) with respect to their evaluation of 
cognitive complexity is that they fail to deal adequately with that process 
so often associated with differentiation, namely, the process of
"integration." The debate as to the independence or interdependence 
of these two processes has been widespread (Schroder & Suedfeld, 1971; 
Schroder, Driver, & Streufert, 1976; Harvey, Hunt, & Schroder, 1961; 
Vannoy, 1965). Werner’s comparative organismic theory of development 
(1957) posits a necessary interdependence of these two processes in 
stressing the dialecticalnature of development.
Each stage of organization is simultaneously directed toward 
maintaining continuity* or stability and generating discontinuity 
or transformation. The fundamental thesis is that evolution is
.i’V.
a synthetic process that interweaves two antithetical organismic 
tendencies: to maintain continuity in ;order to conserve one’s
integrity (survival and organizational coherence) and to ela­
borate discontinuity in order to develop. (Langer, 1970, p. 734) 
Werner, therefore, applied the principle of orthogenesis to psychological 
development, viewing such growth in terms of the complementary processes 
of differentiation, aimed at elaboration of the system, and integration, 
aimed at the maintenance of the organism’s integrity. He identified 
stages of mental development as syntheses of these two antithetical 
processes.
Harvey (1966) has contended that flexibility and adaptability in 
any system is enhanced with increases in differentiation and integration 
within that system, and Conceptual Systems Theory clearly suggests that 
significant differences in flexibility and adaptability do exist across 
the four conceptual systems. Both Campbell (I960) and Brennan (note 4) 
have reported linear increases in complexity across the four conceptual 
systems, with System 4 individuals emerging as highest in cognitive
acomplexity. However, Brennan reported a correlation coefficient of 
only +.21 between scores generated by the Harvey TIB technique and 
those from the Tripodi and Bieri (1963) differentiation technique. 
Streufert and Fromkin (1972) have likewise reported low correlations 
between TIB scores and Bieri’s modified Rep technique analysis of 
differentiation, and Harvey, Reich, and Wyer (1968) found no signi­
ficant differences in differentiation scores between concrete (Systems 
1 & 2 combined) and abstract (Systems 3 & 4 combined) subjects. Further­
more, Harvey, Wyer, and Hautaluoma (1963, note 8) reported no significant 
differences for either differentiation or integrationacross conceptual 
systems, although they did find that System 4 individuals were signifi­
cantly better differentiators than were System 1 individuals.
These findings would appear to cast doubt upon Harvey’s assumption 
(1966) that there exist significant differences between conceptual 
systems on measures of flexibility and adaptability if, indeed, these 
qualities are highly correlated with differentiation and integration 
within the cognitive structure. Thomas and Seeman’s (1972) review of 
research relating cognitive complexity to personal adjustment does, 
in fact, lend support to speculations that flexibility and adaptability 
are correlated with cognitive complexity.
Jones (1954, 1961) found that neuropsychiatric subjects had 
simpler cognitive structures than normal subjects. . . Lundy 
(1952, 1956) and Bannister (personal communication, November 
5, 1967) found that as a person was exposed' to a therapeutic 
relationship his cognitive structures become more differentiated. 
Complex individuals make higher scores on measures of social
9intelligence (Sechrest & Jackson, 1961), are more able to 
assume social roles (Harvey, 1962; Harvey & Kline, 1965;
Wolfe, 1963), and are judged to be better psychotherapists 
(Gottesman, 1962). [Thomas & Seeman, 1972]
If such findings are accepted as evidence of a positive correlation 
between personal adjustment, in terms of flexibility and adaptability, 
and cognitive complexity, then the lack of evidence showing signi­
ficant differences in cognitive complexity across Harvey’s four conceptual 
systems could be interpreted as evidence that Conceptual Systems 
Theory does not discriminate between persons on the basis of adaptability 
and flexibility.
Schroder, Driver, and Streufert (1967) hypothesizetha£ cognitive 
constructs are arranged such that they can be viewed as a series of 
hierarchical levels which successively contain fewer elements as the 
apex is approached. It is assumed that constructs residing at the 
same hierarchical level are uncorrelated; however, when considering 
more than one hierarchical level, constructs residing at different 
levels possess the potential for some degree of correlation, depending 
upon the hierarchical bonding within the particular cognitive structure. 
The implications of such a theoretical model call into question the 
validity of certain techniques of assessing cognitive differentiation 
(e.g., Bieri, 1955; Bieri, Atkins, Briar, Leamon, & Tripodi, 1966;
Tripodi & Bieri, 1963) in that such methods of assessment fail to 
take into consideration differences in the hierarchical level of those 
constructs being analyzed. The hierarchical relationships between 
constructs represent cognitive integration, which is an essential
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aspect of cognitive complexity overlooked by most existing research 
methodologies (e.g., Bieri, et al., 1966).
Crockett (1965) has researched the area of cognitive complexity 
taking into consideration both the process of differentiation and that 
of integration. Crockett (1965) defines differentiation in terms of 
the number of independent constructs used by an individual, whereas he 
characterizes integration in terms of both, "the complexity of the 
relationships among constructs, and the degree to which clusters of 
constructs are related by superordinate, integrating constructs"
(Crockett, 1965, p. 50). Furthermore, Crockett found some evidence 
indicating that, "subjects who show a highly complex "system with respect 
to one domain of events will also show high complexity: with respect to 
other domains" (Crockett, 1965, p. 62). This finding lends credence 
to theoretical speculation that cognitive "structure," rather than 
simply learned content, is basic to cognitive complexity.
The present study, in exploring the relationship between conceptual 
systems theory and cognitive complexity, adopts a model of cognitive 
structure which conforms to Bannister’s conception of the structure of 
construct systems as stated below:
This pyramidal structure of construct systems seems to serve 
a variety of purposes in science and in living. For example, if 
we accept that the more superordinate constructs will have more impli­
cations and a wider range of convenience than their subordinate 
constructs, then ’climbing up our system’ may be a way of finding 
strategies for cross-referencing more subordinate constructions 
which cannot be directly related to each other ’across’ the system. 
Thus the old adage that you can’t add ’horses’ and ’cows’ is nonsense 
as soon as you climb up the subsystem and subsume them both as 
’farm animals’ and you can blithely add in ’hermit crabs' if you are
prepared to climb up as far as 1 forms of organic life.' Equally, 
you may use the hierarchy as a conflict-resolving process by making 
decisions in terms of the most superordinate, relevant construct. 
For example, for some of us ’courteous-discourteous’ may be a 
subordinate construct to ’kind-unkind’, and if this be so we may, 
in exceptional circumstances, decide to be ’discourteous’ if we 
feel that in the long run this is the ’kindest’ way to be 
(say in curtailing a mutually disastrous relationship).
[Bannister, 1970, p. 57]
The present model, therefore, conceives of cognitive structure as 
being pyramidal in shape, with those constructs lying closest to the 
apex of the pyramidal structure being the more superordinate constructs 
within the system. Cognitive structure may be viewed as a series of 
hierarchical levels wherein those constructs at any one particular 
level are, by definition, independent from other constructs at the 
same hierarchical level. Although perhaps best represented in three- 
dimensional form, Figure 1 presents this concept in two-dimensional 
form for the sake of simplicity. All connections between constructs 
in this model occur between hierarchical levels rather than within 
a particular hierarchical level. It should be noted that within this
Insert Figure 1 about here
model there is the possibility for relationships between constructs of 
nonadjacent levels, although only, three such connections ■ (represented 
as dotted lines) are demonstrated in the present model. Furthermore,
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the actual number of hierarchical levels are hypothesized to vary a 
great deal among subjects, and it is this number of levels which will 
be explored as one of the possible indicators of cognitive complexity.
Hinkle (1965) introduced two very promising methods of exploring 
the hierarchical relationships between constructs in the form of an 
"implication grid" and a "laddering procedure," and he thereby introduced 
into grid methodology the means whereby integration could be considered 
along with differentiation so as to afford a more complete picture of 
cognitive structure. The implication grid technique involves the 
comparison of each construct with every other so as'to allow assessment 
of the superordinate-subordinate relationships within a particular set 
of constructs. The laddering procedure is a technique whereby the 
experimenter elicits a series of constructs, starting from a position 
of subordinancy within the cognitive system and moving in a stepwise 
fashion up through the hierarchical structure until the subject reaches 
that point which is presumed to be the apex of his/her cognitive 
structure.- Hinkle (1965) devised this technique to explore the 
hierarchical relationships between construct dimensions within the 
individual’s cognitive structure, and the result of this process is 
the delineation of a pathway of successive superordinate implications.
The present study utilized the laddering technique by starting 
the process at what was determined by use of the implication grid 
to be a relatively subordinate position within the individual’s 
cognitive structure. Constructs of progressively increasing super- 
ordinancy were theh. elicited until the subjects could produce no fur­
ther superordinate constructs. The number of new constructs produced
was seen to represent the number of hierarchical levels within the 
individual’s cognitive structure, and this number of hierarchical 
levels was then used as an indicator of cognitive complexity. The 
assumption made, herein, to justify the use of this measure as an 
indicator of cognitive complexity involves the theoretical speculation 
that whereas differentiation along a particular hierarchical level is 
inherently limited by a lack of integrative links, as demonstrated in 
Figure 1, differentiation with respect to hierarchical level represents 
the number of units of height of the pyramidal cognitive structure.
Each level has a separate differentiation potential and is integratively 
linked to other levels. Werner’s theory (Carmichael, 1970) purports 
that cognitive complexity can only proceed so long as the organism’s 
integrity is maintained, and such maintenance is a function of inte­
grative links which, in the model just presented, necessarily involves 
separate hierarchical levels. Comparing this measure with most of the 
differentiation analyses of the Rep technique which have been used to 
estimate cognitive complexity (Bannister & Mair, 1968), one finds that 
with the differentiation techniques one is measuring the number of 
independent constructs, with such independence being the result of 
separate constructs having few or no perceptible links existing between 
them for that particular subject. On the other hand, consider the 
constructs ’considerate’ and ’kind.’ It may be hypothesized that for 
some persons these two concepts are relatively synonymous, such that 
whenever such a person perceives either one of these two qualities, 
the other quality automatically becomes a part of that perception.
Thus, if one perceives the quality of ’considerateness’ in another,
he/she also necessarily perceives that other person as being ’kind,’ 
since for such an individual these two qualities are not differentiated 
from one another.
A further aspect of complexity with which the differentiation 
measure appears to be unable to deal is whether or not an individual 
actually perceives two such constructs as simply synonomous terms, 
or whether the individual does, in fact, discriminate between the two 
terms even though he/she tends to see them as covarying with one 
another. This latter case clearly represents greater discriminability 
than does the former, yet the differentiation analysis may fail to 
discriminate between these two cases. Keeping mind the cognitive 
structure model which has been proposed, one can see that cognitive 
complexity:^ as measured by differentiation, increases in proportion to 
the extent to which the subject originally generated either constructs 
horizontally positioned with respect to one another (at the same 
heirarchical level) or constructs from different hierarchical levels 
but with no superordinate-subordinate relationship existing betxveen the 
two constructs for that particular subject. The danger with relying 
upon such an analysis is that if a subject chooses a number of separate 
constructs which are hierarchically related to one another, the subject’ 
cognitive complexity may appear lower than it should due to the lack 
of sensitivity of the measuring instrument being used.
In the present study, methods other than differentiation are 
explored as possible indicators of cognitive complexity. Based upon 
the cognitive model presented, "hierarchical differentiation" or 
"integrated differentiation" would appear to be a feasible and perhaps
preferable alternative to the differentiation analysis of the Rep 
technique (e.g., Bieri* 1955; Tripodi & Bieri, 1963) since hierarchical 
differentiation involves both differentiation and integration, these 
being the two components of cognitive complexity identified by Crockett 
(1965). Whereas one’s differentiation score is based upon the number 
of constructs generated which do no imply one another, and therefore 
are not identified as identical in content, one's laddering score is • 
based upon the number of constructs which one can generate while 
continually moving in the direction of increasing superordinancy.
Rather than sampling a random set of interpersonal constructs and
.yV..
analyzing them in terms of their degree of independence from one 
another, with no controls over the superordinate-subordinate relationships 
among those constructs, the laddering technique :attempts to*measure the 
number of hierarchical levels within one's cognitive structure by 
attempting to tap a series of constructs wherein each construct is from 
a different hierarchical level and .has implications with respect to at 
least two other constructs in the series (i.e., one superordinata 
implication and one subordinate implication). The primary advantage 
of the laddering procedure would appear to be that all subjects are 
operating under the same ground rules in their selection of constructs', 
whereas with the differentiation analysis of the Rep technique subjects 
are free to choose from any: number of hierarchical levels, such that 
a person who chooses from a single level would necessarily appear to 
be quite differentiated whereas one who chooses from a series of levels 
has a greater chance of selecting constructs related by superordinate- 
subordinate implications. In a differentiation analysis of a set of
16
constructs, the greater the number of superordinate-subordinate impli­
cations, the greater the likelihood is of those constructs being analyzed 
as undifferentiated from one another. It is suggested, therefore, 
that "differentiation" (Bieri, 1963; et al.) and "integrated differen­
tiation11 (as measured by the aforementioned laddering technique) have 
different referents with regard to cognitive structure. Since "inte­
grated differentiation" takes into consideration "integration" in addition 
to "differentiation,"it is hypothesized that a non-sighificant 
Spearman Rho correlation will be found to exist between differentiation 
scores and laddering scores.
The "integrated differentiation" measure will be further examined 
by dividing laddering scores into a high, medium, and low group, such 
that four additional measures can be tested as to their potential 
usefulness as differentiators among the three group of laddering scores.
These measures, derived from the Implication Grid and referred to by 
Crockett and Meisel (1974) as "degree of connectedness" indicators, 
are determined by the number of times the various constructs within 
the cognitive system imply the presence or absence of other constructs 
within the system. These degree of connectedness scores will be of 
two primary types, namely, those that disregard reciprocal implications 
and those that include reciprocal implications in their computation.
A further division within each of these two major categories will 
consist of separate connectedness scores computed first for constructs 
generated by the Rep technique, and, secondly, for constructs generated 
by the laddering technique. Thus, the four connectedness scores 
examined are as follows: Rep connectedness with reciprocals (RepconWR),
Rep connectedness with no reciprocals (RepconNR), Laddering connectedness 
with reciprocals (LadconWR), and Laddering connectedness with no 
reciprocals (LadconNR). Crockett and Meisel (1974), in their use of
the "degree of connectedness," did not discount reciprocal implications, 
and according to the cognitive model presented herein, one could anti­
cipate that there would be a negative correlation between RepconWR 
scores and differentiation scores if, in fact, a significant proportion 
of the implications were reciprocal. Such an hypothesis is based upon 
the fact that within the context of the present model reciprocal impli­
cations are interpreted as demonstrating a lack of differentiation 
between those constructs being compared since the constructs demonstrate 
no superordinate-subordinate relationship to one another. Rather, 
such reciprocal implications imply synonomous relationships between 
constructs of the same hierarchical level. On the other hand, RepconNR 
scores are hypothesized to have a positive correlation with differentiation 
scores since the ability to perceive quantitative differences in the 
degree of implication of the two constructs indicates both ability to 
discern between ftiose constructs and the fact that the relationship 
between those constructs is one of superordinancy-subordinancy. It 
is anticipated, however, that this correlation will not exceed the 
+ .2 to + .3 range since differentiation scores tend to misrepresent 
superordinate-subordinate relationships, viewing them as indicative 
of a synonomous relationship between constructs rather than as 
differentiated constructs. Since differentiation scores are derived 
from comparisons of the ratings of the various constructs across 
role categories, there is no direct comparison of constructs in the 
differentiation analysis. It is due to this factor that RepconNR 
analyses are predicted to be only moderately correlated with the 
differentiation analyses. Whereas a differentiation analysis fails
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to discriminate between covariation of construct ratings based upon 
synonomous relationships and covariation based upon superordinate- 
subordinate relationships, RepconNR scores do distinguish between 
these forms of construct relationships.
With regard to the usefulness of the "degree of connectedness” 
indicators as differentiators of low, medium, and high laddering scores, 
it is anticipated that RepconNR scores, LadconNR scores, and! LadconWR 
scores will all differentiate among subjects of high, medium and 
low laddering complexity. It is theorized that LadconNR scores and 
LadconWR scores will not be significantly different from one another 
since both of these connectedness scores are derived^from constructs 
which were drawn from different hierarchical levels. Therefore, very
“'L'rV
few, if any, reciprocal implications are anticipated to emerge in the 
computation of the LadconWR scores, and as such, RepconNR scores,
LadconNR scores, and LadconWR scores are all predicted to accurately 
reflect the relative degree of connectedness (non-reciprocal implications) 
of the subjects’ cognitive structures. These three scores are thus 
theorized to represent hierarchical integration within cognitive 
structure, and are therefore anticipated to differentiate among the 
low, medium and high laddering scores which are also theorized to 
reflect the relative degree of hierarchical integration. It is also 
expected that RepconWR scores will discriminate between the high and 
low laddering complexity groups, however, in this case the high RepconWR 
scores, indicating a lack of hierarchical differentiation, are predicted 
to be associated with the low laddering group, whereas the low RepconWR 
scores are predicted to be associated with the high laddering group.
The final part of this study will consider the relationship between 
cognitive complexity and Conceptual Systems Theory. This will be done 
be viewing each of five potential cognitive complexity indicators 
(i.e., differentiation scores, laddering scores, RepconWR scores,
RepconNR scores, and LadconWR scores) as potential discriminators of 
Harvey’s four conceptual systems, analyzed by means of five one-way 
analyses of variance. Based upon previous findings (i.e., Streufert 
& Fromkin, 1972; Harvey, Reich, & Wyer, 1968; Harvey, Wyer, & Hauta- 
luoma, 1963; Brennan, 1973) and upon Harvey’s personal speculations 
(Harvey,: note 3) concerning the existence of stages within conceptual 
systems, it is anticipated that there will be no significant differences 
found with respect to cognitive complexity, as measured by'any of these 
techniques, across the four conceptual systems posed by Harvey, et al.. 
(1961).
The following hypothesis are therefore proposed:
1. No significant correlation will be found to exist between 
differentiation scores based upon the Rep technique and hierarchical 
differentiation scores determined by the laddering technique. This 
is based upon the supposition that the. laddering technique estimates 
the number of hierarchical levels in the cognitive structure, indicating 
both differentiation and integration according to the cognitive structure 
model presented herein. This is in contradistinction to the Rep tech­
nique based differentiation scores which indicate the extent to which 
individuals apply constructs differentially across a set of significant 
others, thereby ignoring the important factor of integration, i It is
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this difference which gives rise to the hypothesis that a non-significant 
Spearman Rho correlation will be found to exist between differentiation 
scores and laddering scores.
2. Two of the connectedness scores will be compared with differ-
i
entiation scores using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients, 
with the expectation that RepconWR scores will be negatively correlated 
with differentiation scores and that RepconNR scores will be positively 
correlated with differentiation scores. This prediction is derived
from the cognitive model herein presented which suggests that reciprocal
■ vV_
implications are indicative of a lack of differentiation between constructs. 
The correlation between RepconNR scores and differentiation scores, 
however, is not expected to exceed the + .2 to + .3 range since 
differentiation scores fail to discriminate between synonomous rela­
tionships and superordinate-subordinate relationships between constructs.
3. A series of one-way analyses of variance will determine 
which of four dependent variables will discriminate between subjects 
who have been separated into groups of high, medium, and low laddering 
complexity. The four dependent variables tested are the four connec­
tedness scores. RepconNR scores, LadconNR scores, and LadconWR scores- 
are all expected to discriminate among the three laddering groups, and 
these predictions are all based upon the premise that the number of 
hierarchical steps (laddering score) is indicative of the overall 
cognitive complexity, and that the higher the cognitive complexity 
(high laddering score), the higher the degree of'connectedness 
(hierarchical integration). RepconWR scores are1 also predicted to
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differentiate between the high and low laddering complexity groups, 
although in this case an inverse relationship is hypothesized.
4. Five one-way analyses of variance will be performed to test 
the feasibility of using differentiation scores, laddering scores,
RepconWR scores, RepconNR scores, and LadconWR scores as possible 
differentiators among Harvey’s four conceptual systems. It is 
predicted that none of these postulated cognitive complexity indicators 
will adequately differentiate among belief systems due to the hypothesis
that these systems, rather than being sequential with respect to
•;>




Fifty-four graduate and undergraduate, students from the University 
of Nebraska at Omaha served as subjects, of which 35 were females and 
19 were males. This sample consisted of 17 System 1 individuals,
11 from System 2, 11 from System 3, and 15 from System 4, and the great 
majority of these persons received extra credit for their participation.
These 54 subjects were chosen as the best representatives of their respective 
conceptual systems from among approximately 150 subjects who were initially 
administered the "This I Believe Test."
Procedure
Assessment of Conceptual Systems
Conceptual level was established by relying on the "This I Believe 
Test" (TIB), an instrument devised by Harvey (1963) which has been shown 
to have a test-retest reliability over a nine.week period of .94 (Greaves, 1971)
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and an interjudge reliability of .90 when trained judges are used. (Harvey, 
1966) This test asked that the subject indicate his beliefs with respect 
to 10 concepts assumed to be relevant to him, and in each case the particular
referent was indicated by the phrase, "This I believe about __________ ," with
the blank filled by one of the following referents: the American way of
life, religion, people, marriage, friendship, sin, rules, revenge, lying, 
and calling a teacher by his/her first name. The test was presented 
to the subjects in the form of a booklet with the phrase inclusive of one 
of the referents at the top of each page. The cover to this booklet included 
the following instructions: %
On the following pages you will be asked to write your opinions 
or beliefs about several topics. Please write at least two (2) 
sentences about each topic. You will be timed on each topic at a 
pace that will make it necessary for you to work rapidly.
Be sure to write what you genuinely believe.
You must write on the topics in the order of their appearance.
Wait to turn each page until the experimenter gives you the signal.
Once you have turned the page, do not turn back to it.
PLEASE.DO NOT OPEN THIS BOOKLET UNTIL YOU ARE INSTRUCTED TO BEGIN. (Harvey, 
note 1, pg. 22).
The timing for these ten referents varied, with the first five being 
allotted 2 minutes each and the second five given 1 minute and 45 seconds 
each. This cut in time for the second five referents was introduced 
so as to meet Harvey’s recommendation that pressure be kept on the 
individual in order to maximize an indication ofi the belief.
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The classification of these TIB tests into conceptual systems was 
based on HarveyTs scoring instructions (Harvey, note 1), and the criteria 
for selection of a subject as representative of a particular conceptual 
system was initially based upon the agreement of five out of six judges. 
Expediency required that criteria for selection be altered after approximately 
one half of the subjects had been selected, with the altered standards 
being the unanimous agreement of three judges. The scoring process 
is based upon an overall rating of the booklet in its entirety rather 
than an additive approach which considers the response to each referent 
separately.
Assessment of Interpersonal Cognitive Complexity
Role Construct Repertory Technique. This procedure for investigating 
an individual’s construct system was devised by Kelly (1955) and relied upon 
by Bieri (1955) in his attempt to measure cognitive complexity with respect 
to one’s interpersonal environment. A detailed review of Role Construct 
Repertory (REP) technique has been developed by Bannister and Mair (1968).
In the present experiment the subject was presented with a 10 x 15 grid 
(Appendix 1) and asked to fill in the ten spaces across the top with 
individuals from his/her social environment who fit the particular role 
categories provided. These role categories consisted of the following:
(1) Mother or person who is most like a mother to you; (2) Father or 
person who is most like a father to you; (3) Brother nearest your age or, 
if you do not have a brother, then the person who is most like a brother 
to you; (4) Sister nearest your age or, if you do not have a sister, then 
the person who is most like a sister to you; (5'f Husband or wife or, if
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you are not married, a close friend of the opposite sex; (6) Close friend 
of the same sex as yourself; (7) Person you dislike; (8) Person who seems 
to dislike you; (9) Person who makes you feel uncomfortable; (10) Boss or 
person who holds a position of authority over you. Each of the fifteen 
rows of the grid had three different role categories marked, and the 
subject was asked to successively consider each row of the grid and 
determine some personality characteristic on which two of the individuals 
were similar and different from the third. In order that all subjects 
operate within the same general parameters, they were instructed to avoid
physical descriptions. In the course of generating -the adjective dimensions
*. •..
the subjects were monitored and informed of those constructs which were 
unsatisfactory and necessitated alteration (e.g., male-female, from 
one location-from a different location). After generating the fifteen 
construct dimensions, subjects were asked to rate each of the ten 
individuals (role categories) on each of the fifteen dimensions. These 
ratings were based upon a 7-point Likert-type scale, with one through 
three indicating degrees along the similarity pole of the dimension, 
four being neutral or indicating that the dimension does not apply to 
the individual, and five through seven indicating degrees along the contrast 
pole of dimension. These ratings were placed in the grid box corresponding 
to the particular individual— construct dimension comparison being considered. 
Finally, subjects were asked to make a forced choice with respect to 
pole preference for each of the fifteen adjective dimensions.
This Rep grid was analyzed using a modified form of Bieri's (1955) 
technique, devised by Millimet (note 5), so as to arrive at a measure 
of differentiation. This procedure has been described by Millimet and 
Brien (note 6) as follows:
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The scoring procedure...consists of subtracting the 10 ratings 
associated with one construct dimension from the corresponding 
10 ratings of a second construct dimension. The 10 difference 
scores, including sign, are compared to each other so that all 
possible pairings (45) are considered. One point is scored for 
each pair of differences which are identical in sign and value.
This procedure is performed for each of the 105 pairings of the 
15 construct dimensions and summed to derive a total construct 
differentiation score which can range from 0 to 4725. The lower 
the total score, the greater the dif ferentiationy,n. one’s personal 
construct system. A minor modification in scoring is required to 
facilitate the analysis for some instances where' a/negative 
relationship exists between the construct dimensions. (Millimet 
& Brien, note 6, pg. 6)
Implication Grid Technique. This procedure was devised by Hinkle 
(1965) to make pairwise comparisons between constructs within a grid 
framework, thereby yielding Ma schematic representation (in matrix form) 
of the superordinate and subordinate implications that interrelate a set 
of constructs.” (Bannister & Mair, 1968, p. 88). Subjects were presented 
with a 25 x 25 grid, on which the preferred pole of those constructs 
generated in the REP test were listed in the same order both down the 
side of the grid as well as across the top of the grid. Those listed 
did not include repetitions which may have appeared on the REP test.
Each construct was paired twice with every other (i.e., 1 with 2,
2 with 1, etc.), and therefore if 15 nonreplicated constructs had been 
initially generated, the subject would make 210 comparisons (no construct 
being paired with itself). The instructions to.the subjects were as follows:
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In this task you are asked to consider the following: "If you know
that a particular characteristic is true of a stranger, to what 
extent would you be able to assume that certain other characteristics 
are also true of that stranger?"
Taking one at a time, you will consider those attribute dimensions 
to the right of the grid (rows) as characteristics assumed to be 
true of the stranger, and those at the top of the grid (columns) 
as possible implications. For each comparison you will consider 
the amount of information that the row characteristic ("characteristic 
assumed to be true") provides you with respect to* the column 
characteristic ("characteristic possibly implied"). For example, 
consider that the only thing one 1knows1 about a stranger is that 
he/she is "friendly" (row characteristic —  assumed to be true); 
to what extent would you then be able to assume that the stranger 
is also "honest" (column characteristic —  possibly implied)?
For comparing each row characteristic to each column characteristic, 
use a 0 to 3 rating scale as follows:
0 = knowledge of first (row) characteristic gives no information
about second (column) -characteristic
1 = knowledge of first (row) characteristic gives a. small- amount
of information about second (column) characteristic
2 = knowledge of first (row) characteristic gives a: moderate
amount of information about second (column) characteristic
3 - knowledge of first (row) characteristic gives a great deal
ofinformation about second (column) characteristic.
Compare each row characteristic to each column characteristic using 
this scale.
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The Implication Grid technique (Imp Grid) was used for two different 
purposes in the present study. First, it was used to look at the 
general superordinate-subordinate positioning of constructs within a 
particular cognitive structure. Superordinate constructs are assumed
t
to give more information concerning their subordinate counterparts than 
vice versa, and thus, in a situation where the construct "sincerity*1 
yields "a great deal of information" (3 rating) concerning "honesty," 
whereas "honesty" yields only "a-small amount of information" (1 rating) 
with respect to "sincerity," one could conclude that "sincerity" holds 
a superordinate position to "honesty" within that particular cognitive 
schema. In order that the laddering technique accurately reflect cognitive 
complexity it is essential that the procedure begin with subordinate 
constructs within the system. By summing the rows of the Imp Grid, 
information is obtained concerning the amount of information each construct 
implies with respect to the rest of the constructs within the system, and 
this may be used as an indicator of superordinancy. By selecting for 
laddering those constructs whose implication score resulted in the smallest 
sum, one can be assured that the bottom construct in the ladder implies 
relatively little about the rest of the generated constructs, and thus 
the assumption can'be made that the laddering procedure is beginning at 
a relatively subordinate position within the cognitive structure. By 
laddering off of the most subordinate constructs within the system, 
probabilities are maximized for eliciting the greatest number of constructs 
from different hierarchical levels.
"Second, the Imp Grid was used to arrive at what Hinkle (1965) referred 
to as "degree of connectedness", this measure being viewed as an indicator
28
of integration within the system. Hinkle arrived at this score by simply 
counting the total number of two’s and three’s within the grid, but the 
present study found it necessary to divide this total by the total possible 
number of two’s and three’s so as to standardize for the fact that the 
different subject grids were of varying sizes. In addition, reciprocal 
implications were hypothesized to imply lack of differentiation between 
constructs, and thus, in a situation where construct A gave a moderate 
amount of information about construct B (rate ”2") and B gave a moderate 
amount of information about construct A (rated ”2”), these ratings were 
ignored in computing those connectedness scores which discounted reciprocals. 
However, if construct A gave a great deal of information concerning the 
presence of absence of construct B (rated ”3”) whereas construct B only 
gave a moderate amount of information concerning the presence of absence 
of construct A (rated ”2”), then the relationship was not considered to 
be reciprocal and both ratings were included in the computation of those 
’’degree of connectedness" scores discounting reciprocals. On the other 
hand, for those degree of connectedness scores which did not discount 
reciprocals, the scores simply consisted of the total number of two’s 
and three’s in the grid divided by the total possible number of two’s and 
three* s.
Laddering Techniques. Hinkle’s (1965) development of the laddering 
procedure was precipitated by what he perceived as the necessity of 
taking into consideration hierarchical integration when investigating 
cognitive structure. In viewing the results of this measure as an 
indication of cognitive complexity, as the present study proceeds to do,
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one is assuming that cognitive structure is pyramidal or triangular 
in shape and that those constructs located near the apex of the structure 
tend to be superordinate to and have broader "ranges of convenience"
(Kelly, 1955) than do those constructs nearer to the base. As used herein, 
this procedure is simply an attempt to measure the number of hierarchical 
levels within a subject’s cognitive structure.
The laddering procedure began by writing down the subordinate 
construct dimension selected on the basis of Imp Grid analysis, and asking 
the subject to explain why he/she had preferred the one pole of the construct 
to the other. Such questions were posed as, "What a r ^  the advantages of 
this side to that side?" (pointing) [Bannister & Mair, 1968, p. 84], and,
"Why do you value this (pointing) over that? Does this (pointing) serve 
some higher function for you that is not served by that (pointing)?"
Thus, for example, a subject might start from the dimension 
"reserved-emotional” (preferring to see himself at the "reserved" 
pole) and in answer to the question, "Why do you prefer to be 
’reserved’?", might indicate that reserved people tend to be 
"relaxed" while emotional people tend to be "nervous." The 
dimension "relaxed-nervous" would then be taken as the first 
superordinate construction, with the subject preferring to view 
himself as "relaxed." Next (in answer to "why?") he might suggest 
that he preferred being relaxed because, in his opinion, being 
relaxed would lead to "getting on better with people," while being 
» nervous might result in "difficulties with people." Here the second 
superordinate is "getting on better with people-difficulties with 
people"; the preferred pole is known, and a further query will lead 
on to the next act of superordination and so forth." (Bannister & Mair, 
1968, p. 84)
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After the first superordinate construct had been generated the subject 
was told that the procedure would continue until he/she reached the point 
at which the particular construct was seen to be valued in and of itself, 
such that it could be seen to serve no higher function for that particular 
individual. The subject was further told that it was very important that 
he/she make every effort to reach that point beyond which they could go 
no further in order that an accurate portrayal of their personal values 
could be recorded. In addition, occasionally the subjects were asked to 
go back and review their construct ladder in order to ensure that the
-■ V
movement was continually upwards in terms of their value system-, and 
not downwards or merely definitional in character! Occasionally during 
this review process steps were added, deleted, or altered b£ the subjects.
Although uniformity with respect to the number of ladders produced 
by each subject was initially a part of the experimental design, there 
were rather large disparities between subjects with respect to the time 
required to generate construct ladders, with some subjects requiring as 
much as forty minutes to generate one long ladder of 10 or 11 constructs, 
whereas other subjects would complete four ladders of 3 or 4 constructs 
eachiin as little as fifteen minutes. Thus, although the number of 
ladders completed by subjects varied, the primary criteria sought by 
the experimenter in this task was the maximum number of hierarchical 
steps possibleffor each subject within a particular construct hierarchy 
(ladder). The time factor and the number of ladders attempted by subjects 
were deemed of secondary importance, and therefore were not controlled for 
in the present experiment. Following the elicitation of Lhese additional 
constructs, they were added to the Implication Grid and the subjects were 
asked to complete the grid according to the same procedure previously followed.
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Results
Hypothesis 1^ —  Correlation between differentiation scores and 
laddering scores. This hypothesis predicting a non-significant correlation 
between differentiation sc.ores (high differentiation 'score' indicates low 
cognitive differentiation) and laddering scores was found to be inaccurate.
Rather, a significant positive Spearman Rho correlation coefficient of 
+0.29 (N = 54, p = .016) was found, accounting for approximately nine per­
cent of the variance. The Spearman Rho correlation coefficient was used 
due to the fact that the laddering scores are not necessarily equal interval 
measures.
Hypothesis 2_ —  Correlations between two connectedness scores and 
the differentiation scores. The Pearson product-moment correlation between 
RepconWR and differentiation "scores" was +0.34 (N_ = 54, p = .016) indicating 
a significant positive correlation, whereas that between RepconNR and 
differentiation "scores" was -0.09 (N = 54, £__> .05), and thus non-significant. 
Thus, only the first half of this hypothesis regarding the RepconWR scores, 
was supported.
Hypothesis 3 —  Four connectedness scores as possible discriminators 
of high, medium, and low laddering scores. This hypothesis went unsupported 
with respect to each of the four measures considered. Omnibus 1? values failed 
to reach significance for RepconNR scores (F (2, 51) = 0.54, £  = .591), LadconNR 
scores (F (2, 51) = 0.06, £  = .929), LadconWR scores (F (2, 51) = 0.28, £=^-.759), 
and RepconWR scores (F (2, 51) = 0.84, p = .442). Comparisons were also 
made between the extreme groups (high and low laddering groups) with each of 
Lhe connectedness scores, however, the £ test results for RepconNR scores 
(t (51) = 0.11, £  = .909), LadconNR scores (t (51) = 0.36, £  = .722) LadconWR 
scores (_t_ (51) = 0.17, _£ = .865), and RepconWR scores (_t (51) = 1.22, p = .277) 
all failed to reach the .05 level of significance.
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Hypothesis 4^ —  Differentiation, Laddering scores, RepconWR scores, 
RepconNR scores, and LadconWR scores as possible differentiators among 
Harvey1s four conceptual systems. This hypothesis was supported with 
respect to all five possible discriminators in that "none" of these
measures adequately differentiated among HarveyTs four conceptual systems
'i
in the six one-way analyses of variance performed. Differentiation scores 
(F (3, 50) = 0.25, £  ~ .861), laddering scores (F (3, 50) = 1.26, £  = .299), 
RepconWR scores (F (3, 50) =1.07, £  = .373), RepconNR scores (F (3, 50) = 
1.16, £  = .334), and LadconWR scores (1? (3, 50) = 0.22, £  = .879) all failed 
to achieve significant I? ratios with regard to Harveys four conceptual 
systems. In addition, all possible t test comparisons^, using the pooled
. . v5>" ' •. - 1 * ■ • •
variance terms, were computed for each of these five measures, and even with 
the magnification of Type I errors accompanying such multiple _t tests, no 
significant comparisons were found.
Discussion
Although the major thrust of this investigation involved the 
relationship between Conceptual Systems Theory and cognitive complexity, 
the study additionally sought to explore the adequacy of alternative 
indicators of cognitive complexity in an effort to more accurately reflect 
the actual number of dimensions which an individual uses in interpreting 
his interpersonal environment. Through the introduction of a cognitive 
structure model it was hypothesized that the factor of integration was 
essential as a complementary factor to that of differentiation in acquiring 
an accurate perspective with regard to cognitive complexity. Indicators 
of integration were in the form oj: four separate "degree of connectedness" 
scores as well as in the laddering score, the latter reflecting both
differentiation and integration and therefore viewed as the best single
\
index of cognitive complexity.
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The results regarding Hypothesis 1 demonstrates a significant negative 
correlation between cognitive differentiation and laddering scores since a 
high differentiation "score" indicates low cognitive differentiation. This 
raises several interesting questions regarding the cognitive structure model 
presented herein. One of the basic theoretical underpinnings of this model 
was Werner’s suggestion that differentiation and integration are complementary 
to one another, implying that as one increases, the other does likewise. This 
finding suggests that if Werner’s speculations are correct, the differentiation 
scores may not only give an inaccurate estimate of cognitive complexity but 
may, in fact, lead on to conclusions opposite to those which reflect the 
actual cognitive complexity of the individual. An hypothesis may, therefore, 
be posed that traditional differentiation scores (Bieri, 1963; et al.) not 
only fail to account for cognitive construct integration, but actually mis­
represent integration as a lack of differentiation in a significant number 
of cases. While it was originally hypothesized that this situation would 
occur enough so as to lead to a non-significant correlation between dif­
ferentiation and laddering scores, it was unexpected to find the significant 
"negative" correlation emerge.
Findings regarding Hypothesis 2, dealing with correlations between 
RepconWR and RepconNR scores and differentiation scores, were only 
partially supported. The significant positive correlation between RepconWR 
scores and differentiation "scores" indicating a significant negative cor- 
relation between RepconWR scores/) "cognitive differentiation", implies that 
a significant number of the implications for the Rep constructs were recip­
rocal, and therefore would be rated quite similarly across role categories 
in the differentiation analysis using the Rep technique. This would appear 
to indicate that reciprocal implications on the Imp Grid, interpreted as 
implying synonomous relationships between constructs, represent a lack of
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cognitive differentiation. RepconNR scores, however, were found to have a 
non-significant correlation with differentiation scores, a finding running 
counter to prediction. The lack of significant correlation may be accounted 
for by the fact that differentiation analysis misrepresents superordinate- 
subordinate relationships, as signifying a lack of differentiation rather than 
as representative of cognitive integration.
The findings regarding Hypothesis 3 demonstrated that none of the 
four connectedness socres were effective discriminators of the thre lad­
dering groups, thereby contradicting predictions for each of the four con­
nectedness scores. However, the result of these computations revealed that 
there was a greater difference between the I? ratio for LadconWR scores and 
laddering groups and the _F ratio for LadconNR scores and laddering groups 
than would have been expected since one of the premises adopted at the 
outset of this research was that there would be little variation between 
connectedness scores with reciprocals and those without reciprocals for the 
"laddered" constructs. However, upon observing these F values it was 
decided that a comparison of these two laddering connectedness scores should 
be made. A t_ test between LadconWR scores (M = 1.87) and LadconNR scores 
(M = 0.29) yielded highly significant results (t_ (53) = 20.99, _£ < .001) 
indicating the inaccuracy of the initial assumption and demonstrating that 
constructs from different hierarchical levels may, indeed, be rated 
reciprocally in terms of implication schores. This finding clearly suggests 
that reciprocal implications should not be discounted when computing 
connectedness scores, and, as such, RepconWR scores and LadconWr scores emerge 
as the two most important connectedness measures in the calculation of 
cognitive integration.
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The fact that neither LadconWR scores nor RepconWR scores discriminated 
among high, medium, and low laddering scores may be attributed to the fact 
that neither of these two connectedness scores accounts for both the 
differentiation and integration aspects of cognitive complexity, whereas 
in theory, at least, the laddering technique would appear to incorporate 
both of these components. One possible error with regard to relying upon 
RepconWR scores or LadconWR scores to represent cognitive complexity is 
conceivable in the situation where a subject has for his/her superordinate 
constructs the dimension "good-bad" or "pleasant-unpleasant," and tends to 
easily make the jump from the majority of his/her subordinate constructs 
to that superordinate dimension. The ease in jumping from subordinate to 
superordinate dimensions may well be due to a lack of intervening hierarchical 
levels, but nevertheless such a seemingly simplistic mode of interpreting 
situations could result in a relatively high connectedness score. It may 
be that the more hierarchical levels one has within his/her cognitive structure, 
the more difficult it is to perceive direct implications between very 
low-level constructs and superordinate constructs. Although this represents 
only one example of a situation wherein connectedness scores could misrepresent 
cognitive complexity, it is the contention of this investigator that laddering 
scores theoretically offer considerably more potential as accurate 
indicators of cognitive complexity in terms of the model of cognitive 
structure presented herein.
In introducing the triangular-shaped model of cognitive structure 
it was mentioned that a three-dimensional model .could more accurately 
represent the pyramidal structure conceived of as reflecting the relation­
ships between construct dimensions. Figure 2 represents a more complex
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two-dimensional model in three-dimensional form, and it is presented in 
this manner so as to make clear the potential differences in substructure 
(life areas) complexity. The important addition presented herein, therefore,
Insert Figure 2 about here
is that of substructures for different life areas. The need for such an 
addition becomes clear when considering the individual who demonstrates 
a great deal of cognitive complexity with regard to a particular field, 
whereas outside of that particular speciality he/she may demonstrate very 
poor capabilities in comprehending and coping with a vast array of other types 
of life situations. Perhaps this is best exemplified by the stereotyped 
image of the "mad scientist" who, while having a great deal of narrowly 
defined expertise, reveals himself as severely deficient in his capacity 
for interpreting (differentiating and integrating) other life areas (e.g., 
ethics, interpersonal relationships, government, etc.) with the same breadth 
of understanding that he demonstrates within his narrowly defined scientific 
interests.
Figure 2 presents various hierarchical substructures (e.g., inter^ 
personal values, government, religion* ethics, the arts, science, vocation) 
within the cognitive structure, and each of these substructures, repre­
senting various possible life areas, has a separate potential for elaboration 
(hierarchical and horizontal). The "interpersonal values" substructure 
depicts a five stage ladder of the type tapped by the experimental laddering 
technique used in the present study. In order to demonstrate possible 
defining parameters of particular hierarchical levels, four descriptions 
of levels are offered for the vocational life area herein represented as
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''mechanics.1' Thus, whereas interpersonal values are dealt with through 
five hierarchical levels and mechanics by four, science for this 
particular individual may have fifteen levels and religion perhaps three. 
Although there may be a tendency for the various life areas to show 
similarities with respect to their structural complexities (Crockett, 1965), 
it would appear probable that considerable differences in structural 
complexity may exist across life areas for any particular individual.
Future research comparing within-subject complexity variance across life 
areas with between-subject complexity (averaged across life areas) would 
be of considerable benefit in clarifying the extent to, which an individual's 
cognitive structural complexity can be viewed as a singular quantity.
The prediction of this investigator is that the complexity%f cognitive 
structure will be found to be "relatively" constant across life areas.
Such a study could also provide information regarding the degree of 
convergence towards a central superordinate construct when laddering from 
subordinate constructs associated with different life areas.
Regarding Hypothesis 4, the fact that neither the differentiation 
scores, laddering scores, nor connectedness scores discriminated among 
any of the four conceptual systems posited by Harvey, Hunt, and Schroder 
(1961) contributes further evidence that cognitive complexity is not a 
dimension contributing to such a classification system. Rather, it would 
appear that Conceptual Systems Theory draws primarily qualitative, rather 
than quantitative, distinctions among the construct dimensions used by each 
of the four system types. As such, the present findings concur with 
Harvey's more recent speculations (Harvey, note 3) that these conceptual 
systems are not sequentially invariant and probably do not discriminate between 
persons on the basis of the number of dimensions which they use interpreting 
their environments.
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Finally, use of the laddering technique does appear to offer important 
insights into that construct which Bieri identified as cognitive complexity. 
An interesting and potentially significant aspect of this technique is that, 
in almost all cases, subjects appeared to enjoy the task, and oftentimes 
their intrigue was verbalized to the experimenter. Such an attitude may 
well lead to greater accuracy of results over tasks perceived as more tedious 
(e.g., Rep technique and implication grid), however, future studies 
may benefit by exploring the effects of the introversion-extraversion 
dimension on subjects' laddering scores since introverted subjects may have 
an advantage in this task. In addition, there is certainly room for 
further refinement of the laddering technique so as to make it more efficient 
as an evaluative measure, and the need for some standardization of the 
time factor across subjects in the generation of ladders is of fundamental 
importance to future investigators relying on the laddering technique.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Theoretical model of cognitive structure showing 
constructs (circles), perceived relationships between constructs of 
adjacent hierarchical levels (solid lines), and perceived relationships 
between constructs of nonadjacent levels (dotted lines). Included is 
a hypothetical ladder of four constructs elicited by laddering technique
Figure 2* Hypothesized three-dimensional model of cognitive struc­
ture including six life areas, a sample ladder within*the Minterpersonal 
values” life area, and general descriptions of the types of constructs 
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